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Sharing competences in strategic alliances: a 
case study of the Cosan and Shell biofuel venture
Luciana Florêncio de Almeida
Cláudio Antonio Pinheiro Machado Filho
Competências compartilhadas em alianças estratégicas: um estudo da 
aliança Cosan e Shell no mercado de biocombustíveis 
Em um mundo competitivo, a maneira como uma firma estabelece seus arranjos 
organizacionais pode determinar sua capacidade de ampliar suas competências es-
senciais, bem como a possibilidade de atingir novos mercados. Empresas que atuam 
em apenas um mercado encontram obstáculos para se expandir e por meio de alianças 
elas encontram uma forma competitiva de criar valor. Formas híbridas apresentam-
-se primeiramente como alternativas de capturar valor e gerenciar ativos quando o 
mercado e a hierarquia organizacional não apresentam ganhos para a competitividade 
da firma. Como resultado, essa forma apresenta desafios como a alocação de direitos 
e os problemas de agência. O mercado de biocombustíveis tem apresentado mudan-
ças contínuas nos últimos dez anos. Novos arranjos intra-firmas apareceram como 
um caminho para participar ou sobreviver no cenário de competição global. Dada a 
necessidade de capital para atingir melhores resultados, tem havido um movimento 
consistente de fusões e aquisições no setor de biocombustíveis, principalmente desde 
a crise financeira de 2008. Em 2011 existiam cinco grandes grupos no Brasil com 
capacidade de moagem de mais de 15 milhões de toneladas por ano: Raízen (joint 
venture entre Cosan e Shell), Louis Dreyfus, Tereos Petrobras, ETH e Bunge. Grandes 
companhias de petróleo têm adotado uma estratégia de diversificação como forma de 
proteção contra os crescentes custos do petróleo. Por meio da análise da aliança entre 
Cosan e Shell no mercado de biocombustíveis brasileiros, neste artigo avalia-se o 
modo de governança e os desafios que surgem quando as firmas buscam atingir novos 
mercado pelo compartilhamento de competências essenciais com empresas locais. 
Neste artigo tem-se por base pesquisa documental e entrevistas com analistas do de-
partamento de Relações com Investidores da Cosan e examinam-se as questões centrais 
que permeiam as formas híbridas por meio de Teoria dos Custos de Transação, Teoria 
da Agência, Visão Baseada em Recursos e da abordagem das capacidades dinâmicas. 
Um ponto focal neste estudo é a apropriação do conhecimento e os ativos específicos 
gerados com a aliança estratégica. Uma vez que a aliança é formada espera-se que as 
competências sejam compartilhadas e novas capacidades expandam os limites da firma. 
Cosan e Shell compartilham uma série de recursos estratégicos relacionados às suas 
competências. A Raízen foi formada com base em incentivos econômicos, bem como 
na melhoria dos recursos internos que aumentassem a presença da empresa no setor 
de energia mundial. Entretanto, alguns desafios podem estar relacionados ao controle 
e ao monitoramento dos agentes, considerando que a empresa Raízen é composta por 
duas partes com culturas organizacionais, conhecimentos tácitos e incentivos de longo 
prazo distintos. O caso estudado ilustra um arranjo híbrido como forma alternativa de 
organizar as transações entre firmas: nem mercado nem hierarquia, mas sim uma forma 
mais flexível de arranjo com uma autoridade central. Os mecanismos de governança 
corporativa são igualmente um desafio, uma vez que o alinhamento entre companhias 
parentes em joint ventures é bastante complexo. Essas características conduzem a um 
organismo com dependência bilateral, oferecendo condições favoráveis para desen-
volver capacidades dinâmicas. Entretanto, essas condições dependem dos interesses 
de longo prazo de cada participante da aliança estratégica. 
Palavras-chave: biocombustível, joint venture, aliança estratégica, governança corporativa.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ProÁlcool Governmental Program changed the history 
of fuel in Brazil. Created as a fuel alternative during the oil crisis 
in the 70’s, the sugar/ethanol agribusiness chain peaked in the 
period 1980-1986, subsequently losing ground to petroleum due 
to a drop in prices for the latter of between US$12 to US$20/
barrel from 1986 to 1995 (BIODIESEL.BR, 2011). However, 
the new context of climate change presented a fresh challenge 
to the automotive chain. A new era for renewable fuels in the 
world was marked in Brazil, represented by the creation and 
launch of the Flex Fuel technology in March 2003: hybrid 
engines powered by gasoline and ethanol.
Ethanol comes from several sources, but one offers a 
demonstrable superiority in efficiency: sugar cane, due to its 
higher concentration of biomass per hectare and higher degree 
of fermentation. Currently there are 7 million hectares planted 
in the Southeast, Midwest, South, and Northeast regions of 
Brazil by more than 70,000 sugar cane producers, placing the 
country as the world’s largest producer, with industrial proces-
sing of sugar and ethanol carried out in 397 plants across the 
country. This sector has been growing by 10% annually since 
2003. The Brazilian automobile fleet is composed of 92% Flex 
Fuel cars (UNICA, 2010).
Given the need for capital to achieve better results, there has 
been a consistent movement of mergers and acquisitions in the 
Biofuel sector, especially after the 2008 financial crisis. In 2012 
there were five major groups with a grinding capacity of more 
than 15 million tons per year: Raízen (joint venture formed by 
Cosan and Shell), Louis Dreyfus, Tereos Petrobras, ETH, and 
Bunge. Moreover, major oil companies have implemented the 
strategy of diversification in their business as a hedge against 
the rising cost of oil. The spot price of a barrel of Brent crude 
oil crossed the US$100 threshold in January 2011, generating 
meaningful impacts in supply chains worldwide. There are 
several alternatives to oil being tested and marketed, but none 
has been as successful on a large scale as the extraction of 
ethanol from sugar cane.
Aware of the need to diversify their business, Royal Dutch 
Shell undertook a survey on the market for renewable sources 
in order to invest in promising businesses. The result was the 
establishment of a joint venture with the Brazilian market 
leader in ethanol production, Cosan. The strategic alliance es-
tablished in February 2011 began operations on a grand scale: 
23 sugar mill units, 16 billion gallons of ethanol, 4,500 jobs, 
and $26 billion net revenue (COSAN RI, 2009). Joint venture 
(JV) arrangements are low-risk alternatives compared with 
acquisitions and greenfield strategies for internationalization 
or diversification, and these incentives were central for both 
Cosan and Shell. At the center of this alliance is the sharing of 
knowledge between two market leaders, with their respective 
focus on technology for exploiting biomass fuel and on fuel dis-
tribution. From the standpoint of incentives, the resulting joint 
venture appears logical and promising, but presents important 
governance challenges. The central question of this paper is to 
discuss how JVs involving knowledge transfer should be gov-
erned in order to seek value for their parental companies. This 
paper analyzes the case of Raízen, the resulting joint venture 
between Royal Dutch Shell and Cosan, based on documentary 
research and interviews with Cosan’s Investor Relations staff.
This article has five sections including this introduction. In 
the second, the theoretical framework is presented, discussing 
the origins of the alliances as a source for value seeking and the 
governance challenges of hybrid forms. The third section pro-
vides a panorama of the ethanol market in Brazil and worldwide. 
The fourth section addresses the case in focus (Cosan and Shell 
joint venture). Conclusions are presented in the fifth section.
2. GOVERNANCE MODES, CORE COMPETENCES,  
 AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
This article seeks to frame a theoretical discussion around 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and related literature that 
poses predictions for strategic alliances in a knowledge-sharing 
relationship.
This first section brings to light fundamental concepts of 
TCE and its relationship with other theoretical frameworks, such 
as Resource Based View (RBV) and Porter’s positioning theory 
(1996). The second section presents the TCE and RBV approach 
for alliances, in special joint ventures. The challenges related 
to governance mechanisms are discussed in the final section. 
2.1. Strategizing, economizing, and the dynamic capabilities  
	 of	the	firm
In the modern strategic management literature, Transaction 
Cost Economics plays a pre-eminent role in explaining the 
existence and boundaries of the firm and derived issues such as 
the institutional environment, allocation of rights, governance 
mechanisms, and firm growth. Grounded in Coase’s seminal 
paper, “The Nature of the Firm”, the theory highlights Coase’s 
concerns about the Economics tradition:
“Mainstream economics, as one sees it in the jour-
nals and the textbooks and in the courses taught in 
economics departments, has become more and more 
abstract over time, and although it purports other-
wise, it is in fact little concerned with what happens 
in the real world” (COASE, 1998, p.72)
Searching for answers about the real nature of the firm, 
Coase (1937) concluded that mainstream economics’ concept 
of the firm as a production function was not able to broadly 
explain the limits of a firm. Coase’s theory proposed that re-
sources are not allocated only by price mechanisms; instead, 
they are dependent on the entrepreneur-coordinator. 
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Williamson’s version of TCE makes a link between TCE 
and firm strategy by demonstrating that economizing on 
transaction costs is the best strategy (WILLIAMSON, 1993). 
His theory is grounded in the alignment principle between 
transaction attributes and modes of governance. Williamson 
(1996) further states that some sources of transaction costs are 
the transaction’s attributes – the degree of specific investment, 
the level of uncertainty, and frequency, as well as the behavioral 
hypothesis of limited rationality and potential opportunism. In 
order to minimize those contractual hazards and coordination 
problems, agents may seek a mode of governance in order to 
reduce transaction costs.
Foss (2003, p.141) affirms that
“TCE had very little to say about competitive strat - 
egy, that is, issues relating to positioning in an indu-
stry and defending such a position”.
Nickerson (1997, p.9) points out that TCE approaches the 
transaction as the foundational element to determine a firm’s 
choice of structure, but
“has little to say about which strategy, which accom-
panying transactions, and which investments a firm 
should undertake”.
Williamson (1996) defines two perspectives to approach 
business strategy: strategizing and economizing. He argues 
that economizing is much more fundamental than strategizing, 
since the second
“will rarely prevail if a program is burdened by 
significant cost excesses in production, distribution, 
or organization” (WILLIAMSON, 1996, p.307).
In his understanding, however, both are complementary. 
Along these lines, Nickerson (1997) proposes a positioning-
-economizing theory of strategy that portends integration of 
three approaches: Transaction Cost Economics, the Resource-
-Based View, and Porter’s strategic positioning analysis 
(1996). The contribution of the papers consists in stimulating 
researchers and managers to think outside the box, aggregating 
concepts that are proved mixable. 
The RBV pays close attention to the interaction of a firm’s 
value creation and value appropriation. Foss (2003) argues that 
in a world of positive transaction costs it is costly to capture and 
protect value, and sustaining a competitive advantage implies 
ex ante and ex post costs related to developing and protecting 
resources that are valuable, rare, and costly to imitate and 
substitute. 
According to Teece (1998), a competitive advantage can be 
assigned not only to the ownership of knowledge assets, but 
also to the ability to combine those with other assets needed to 
create value. This assumption is one of the central arguments 
of the dynamic capabilities view of the firm. Combining may 
implicitly mean developing alliances in order to achieve 
competences needed to expand the firm’s profits. The firm’s 
knowledge encompasses all tangible and non-tangible re - 
sourc es it may hold, including all firm-specific assets related to 
its technological competences, knowledge of customer needs, 
and supplier capabilities. 
Teece (1998, p.141) also points out that
“assets can be the source of competitive advantage 
only if they are supported by a regime of strong 
appropriability or are non-tradable or ‘sticky’”.
The competitive advantage might appear when those assets 
are not easily purchased or sold on the market like standard 
commodities. Knowledge, locational assets, and competences 
fall into this category. The main assumption is that those assets 
are difficult to replicate, which implies a source of competitive 
advantage. 
“When it is inherently easy to replicate and intel-
lectual property protection is either unavailable or 
ineffectual, then appropriability is weak.” (TEECE, 
1998, p.141) 
Williamson (1996) presents specific assets as a source of 
integration. When an asset can be redeployable for a second 
use, it might be sold easily. However, when the specific asset 
cannot be redeployable, it may generate a hold-up situation, and 
in order to minimize the transaction costs for ex post disputes, 
the firm might prefer to integrate the holder of the specific 
asset. Several empirical works have showed the validity of this 
argument, notably the seminal article about General Motors’ 
1926 acquisition of Fisher Body by Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian (1978). In this case, the authors highlight an example 
of opportunistic behavior by contracting parties due to the 
presence of firm-specific investments. Moreover, the authors 
point out that a firm may choose to seek advantages by creating 
assets that are specialized in conjunction with the assets of an 
alliance partner. 
Besides physical assets, Williamson (1996) always indicates 
five other classes of distinct asset specificity: site specificity, 
human specificity, dedicated assets, brand name capital, and 
temporal specificity. Together with uncertainty and frequency, 
these transaction dimensions are the fundamental milestones 
along the TCE approach to a make or buy decision. 
If markets and hierarchies are polar modes, the hybrid mode 
– various forms of long-term contracting, reciprocal trading, 
franchising and the like – presents intermediate values in four 
features compared to the other modes. It preserves autonomy, 
there is bilateral dependence, and also the flexibility to adapt to 
the other firm, but the mode may present incentive problems. 
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The next section looks at the hybrid form, especially strategic 
alliances, as a path to access specific assets. 
2.2. The strategy for seeking new markets: the role of alliances 
For Penrose (1995), the firm is a collection of productive 
resources, human and non-human. This concept goes beyond 
the mainstream economic theory of the firm, which considers 
the firm as a set of supply and demand functions. Together 
with Coase (1937), Penrose (1995, p.25) is concerned with 
the real world and draws the distinction between the firm and 
the market:
“firms and markets are both, in their different ways, 
networks of activity, but the difference between them 
is crucial to an understanding of the nature of the 
economy as a whole”.
The key difference is primarily related to the “central man-
agerial direction” presented in firms. Administrative coordina-
tion and “authoritative communication” are not available in the 
market, being firm-specific resources.
The boundaries of the firm for Penrose (1995) are more 
closely related to internal resources than exogenous causes 
of growth such as conditions of demand condition or raising 
capital. In fact, a firm is defined more by its resources than its 
products. If the resources can be potentially employed, demand 
cannot limit a firm’s expansion. 
Penrose (1960, p.1) does not ignore the exogenous impacts 
on a firm’s growth, stating that: 
“[...] growth is governed by a creative and dynamic 
interaction between a firm’s productive resources 
and its market opportunities. Available resources 
limit expansion; unused resources (including tech-
nological and entrepreneurial) stimulate and largely 
determine the direction of expansion. While product 
demand may exert a predominant short-term in-
fluence, over the long term any distinction between 
‘supply’ and demand’ determinants of growth be-
comes arbitrary”.
The firm may use its managerial capabilities in order to 
capture the external environment opportunities in such a 
manner that its growth will be determined by the rate at which 
experienced managerial staff can plan and implement plans. 
For a firm seeking growth, several strategies that can be 
adopted which are not necessarily focused on the pursuit of 
 monopoly power. The modern firm uses strategic alliances in 
 order to capture the capabilities and resources of other com-
panies that can lead to sustainable competitive advantages, 
with the possible consequence of increasing market power. 
According to Penrose (1995, p.172), these consist of: 
“[…] corporate alliances or cooperative arrange-
ments, as driven ‘not necessarily by monopolistic 
intent but as a means of gaining mutual access to 
resources such as technology, regional markets and 
information services’”.
The dynamic capabilities view of the firm proposes the 
acquisition of new competences through organizational learn-
ing, and an important tactic employed in achieving this is the 
strategic alliance. What are the incentives for this approach?
Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) point out that joint 
ventures were originally formed primarily to exploit natural 
resources, and only after the 1970s did these alliances became 
widespread in technology-intensive industries. There are sever-
al incentives for the formation of alliances: access to capital 
markets, internationalization, and acquisition of technological 
and other complex capabilities from partner companies. This 
last incentive is the most cited in studies in this field. 
The relational view literature based on Mowery, Oxley, and 
Silverman (1996) asserts that the source of the competitive 
advantages within partnerships might rest on four conditions 
(DYER and SINGH, 1998): relation-specific assets as source 
of competitive advantage; knowledge-sharing routines based 
on collaborative actions with different stakeholders; comple-
mentary resources and capabilities generated by the partnership; 
and effective governance that minimizes transaction costs. All 
these factors might generate relation rents (quasi-rents) for 
both partners. 
In the TCE literature, the economizing incentive will deter-
mine the contracting level of an alliance. Considering the asset 
specificity argument made by Williamson (1996), the hybrid 
forms can be strongly tied as joint ventures when firms are 
seeking to combine specificities and seize economizing advan-
tages from hierarchy or market modes. Therefore, Williamson 
(1996) views hybrid forms primarily as a contracting mode, 
and uses franchising as an example. In this case, the franchising 
contract creates a coordination incentive in order to protect the 
specific investments in processes and brand. Although there 
will be more cost control and local adaptation compared to the 
hierarchy mode, cost-effective procurements will be reduced 
compared to the market mode.
Addressing equity joint ventures – meaning those formed 
whenever two or more sponsors bring given assets to an inde-
pendent authority company and receive contributions from the 
profits earned – Hennart (1988) distinguishes two types: scale 
JV – when two or more firms embark together on similar actions 
such as forward or backward vertical integration, horizontal ex-
pansion, or diversification; and link JV – constituting a vertical 
investment for one of the parties and a diversification for the 
other. These forms suggest that the hierarchical coordination 
presented by the equity option is preferable to spot markets 
or contracts, and distinguishes from the hierarchy mode once 
control over the JV is shared with other firms.
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Hennart (1988) also argues that the presence of inefficiencies 
in the intermediate market is a necessary condition for JVs to 
emerge. These can include access to raw materials or compon-
ents, knowledge, distribution, and loan capital. As Teece (1998) 
argues, the author also asserts the difficulty of trading knowledge 
in the market. For example, link JVs arise to combine different 
types of knowledge. But is this knowledge transfer effective? 
Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) find that equity joint 
ventures appear to be more effective vehicles for transferring 
complex capabilities than are contract-based alliances due to the 
hierarchical coordination. Their results are based on empirical 
research and econometric models testing the causal relationship 
between technological overlap, R&D intensity and size, and the 
citation of a firm’s patents by the alliance partner. 
Although prior studies have extensively reported JVs as suc-
cessful hybrid forms for economizing purposes such as know - 
ledge transfer, a range of issues arise when it comes to gov-
ernance mechanisms, which will be theme of the next section.
2.3. Hybrid forms and their corporate governance challenges 
The concept of corporate governance, based on the prin-
ciples of transparency, equity, accountability, and ethics, is 
increasingly widespread in the Brazilian market. The Brazilian 
Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC, 2010) defines the 
concept as follows:
“These are the practices and relationships between 
investors / shareholders, board of directors, officers, 
independent auditors and the supervisory board, in 
order to optimize performance of the company and 
facilitate access to capital”.
The issue of separation of ownership and control in modern 
organizations was raised by Berle and Means (1933), and now 
occupies a central position in developing the theory of the 
firm, as highlighted by Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Beginning 
with the seminal work of Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and 
Ross (1974), scholars of the science of organizations began 
to pay attention to the development of the so-called “Agency 
Theory”, later elaborated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Fama and Jensen (1983). The agency problem is an essential 
element within the contractual view of the firm as presented 
by Coase (1937). The “Agency Theory” is central to the issue 
of corporate governance. The principal-agent relationship is 
always conflicted when a particular individual (agent) acts on 
behalf of another (principal) and the goals of both do not fully 
coincide. Thus, whether employer / employee or shareholder 
/ executives, the “principal” seeks to implement a structure of 
incentives and monitoring in order to align the interests of the 
agent to his or her own.
In essence, the practice of good corporate governance is the 
need to economize on “agency costs”, searching for long-term 
interests. Organizational models that emerge from partnerships 
like JVs are very sensitive to conflicts of governance. On one 
hand, this kind of alliance can provide lower costs of scale and 
scope, but on the other, additional agency costs can be decis-
ive for the stability of the alliance. McCahery and Vermeulen 
(2009) point to studies that highlight JV rupture not only in 
cases of societal arrangements with majority and minority par-
ties, but also in situations of shared control such as fifty-fifty 
ownership structure.
Menard and Raynaud (2010) define JVs as complex hybrid 
forms where some rights and some assets are assigned with 
associated payoffs to a “Strategic Center”, while parent firms 
hold main assets and rights. In this case, the authors explain 
(assuming two firms),
“1 and 2 , and four assets (A,a, B,b), with A and 
B highly specific assets related to the core activity 
of 1 and 2, respectively and remaining with their 
boundaries, while a and b are assets valuable only if 
used jointly. Each firm holds full decision rights, Da 
and Db, while rights da and db require coordination” 
(MENARD and RAYNAUD, 2010, p.8).
It is expected that the agents sharing control will be prepared 
to privately monitor the conflicts and ambiguities revealed ex 
post, and that this will require renegotiations and adaptations. 
Therefore, Menard and Raynaud (2010) identified that in cases 
where authority is shared by members of collective ventures, 
they might as well endorse a voting procedure to exercise their 
control rights. Costs will emerge from collective decision-
-making, but they might be lower than ex post enforcement/mon-
itoring costs or public ordering (judicial system) for disputes. 
Efficiency in agency relationships (better alignment) e - 
merg es when some assumptions are presented:
• Agents have no hidden information (absence of information 
asymmetry). The principal knows what constitutes effective 
action and what product is expected.
• The principal has complete information about actions and 
results.
• The agents act at low risk (and are aware that the payment 
received is a result of the alignment with principal interests).
On this basis, the challenges for the JV may be motivated 
by the unlikely symmetry of information between the parties. 
Additionally, the principals in a JV can be “agents” in their 
respective parent companies, characterized by McCahery and 
Vermeulen (2009) as a double agency problem: often the con-
duct of these officers is guided by the hidden agendas of their 
companies, to the detriment of the common agenda of the JV 
in which they act as principals.
A balanced relationship should mitigate, through private 
ordering, possible risks of contract breaches. In practice, the 
“shareholder agreements” in JV alliances constitute an essential 
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mechanism for reducing agency conflicts. These agreements 
should encourage ways to create a relationship of mutual inter-
dependence, sustained by self-regulating norms and reputation-
al issues that align the interests of the parties in the alliance.
As to other challenges in knowledge transfer alliances, 
Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman (1996) argue that cultural dif-
ferences and distance might be obstacles for the governance 
effectiveness of the JV.
3. THE BIOFUEL PANORAMA
Biofuel is the name used to describe fuels that are formed 
by biomass. Among the most common sources are ethanol, 
biodiesel, and methane.
Worldwide, the production of biofuels has been motivated 
by the continuous increase in oil prices, which exceeded the 
US$100/barrel mark in 2008 and have continued to rise (EIA, 
2012). One reason for this increase is the unstable political 
environment of the Middle East region. The Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to increase 
oil prices by 70% in order to embargo the United States after 
the Yom Kippur conflicts in the 1970s. The primary effect of 
this measure was the support for programs focused on diver-
sification of energy sources. Among the new options for fuel 
use, biofuels emerged for energy security in affected countries 
(GORREN, 2009).
After this episode many countries began to seek renewable 
energy sources to replace fossil fuels. According to Sillas Filho 
(2007), global demand for energy will grow 40% by 2020. The 
author argues that among the factors that should further enhance 
the production of biofuels are:
“deficit between supply and energy demand growth, 
declining reserves of fossil fuels, uncertainty in sup-
ply, increasing environmental pressures, demand for 
sustainable and economically viable energy sources” 
(SILLAS FILHO, 2007, p.16).
The trend of growth in the biofuels industry is already 
manifest in consumption levels. Data released by the Brazil-
ian Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) show that global 
consumption will increase from the current 1.1 million barrels 
per day (63.8 billion liters / year) to 4.4 million barrels per day 
(255.3 billion liters / year ) by 2035. In 2012, the ethanol was 
the second most widely-used energy source, behind oil and 
ahead of hydroelectricity. 
Several countries around the world are implementing pol-
icies for biofuels production. The United States, through the 
Energy Policy Act, and the European Union, through the Plan 
of Action of bio-fuels, have set targets to increase the use of 
bio-fuels. These initiatives were especially motivated by the 
context of high oil prices, increased risks in the supply of oil, 
and especially environmental problems.
In the United States, ethanol from maize is the major invest-
ment in biofuels. To meet the growing demand for ethanol, an 
extensive investment program aims to increase the production 
of the fuel. The production structure, as well as new invest-
ments, have been consolidated in the “corn belt”. The result 
has been an increase in ethanol production from approximately 
12.9 billion liters in 2004 to more than $18 billion in 2012 
(FIGUEIRA and BURNQUIST, 2006).
Greater production capacity led to a stimulus in the use 
of biofuel in the USA. The mixture of ethanol (by volume) in 
gasoline rose from 1.5 percent in 2002 to 3.8 percent in 2006, 
representing a consumption of 20.4 billion liters. In January 
2011, the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States 
raised the mixture cap from 10% to 15% ethanol. In Europe, 
the mixing rate is 10% with a prospective increase to 15% 
(KUTAS and AMARAL, 2007).
According to Oliva (2007), biodiesel production in Europe 
represents more than 3.6 billion liters per year, the main sources 
being canola, sunflower, and soybean. Alcohol fuel has a much 
smaller market than biodiesel in the European Union, valued 
at US$2 billion a year but growing. Total demand is expected 
to reach 12.3 billion liters in 2010 (WSJ, 2011).
The United States and Brazil remain the largest producers 
and consumers of biofuels. The USA will account for 38% of 
global consumption of biofuels in 2035 – a decrease from the 
current 45% – while Brazil will be responsible for 20% of global 
consumption of biofuels in 2035 – a reduction from 28% now. 
The drop is due to the expected entry of new biofuel-consuming 
countries in this period (MME, 2010).
Just as new countries are projected to enter the biofuel 
production chain, there is also the expectation that new prod-
ucts will be introduced, known as non-conventional biofuels 
or biofuel-edge.
Unconventional biofuel products will enter the market from 
2020, primarily in Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries. These unconventional 
fuels will account for 36% of the total use of biofuels in OECD 
countries in 2035, but only 5% of total use of biofuels in coun-
tries outside the OECD (MME, 2010). In Brazil, the so-called 
second generation will come from sugar cane bagasse. 
Biofuel production in Brazil dates to the 1920s, when 
vegetable oils were introduced in industry. In 1938, the first 
Brazilian biofuel subsidy was launched by Law No. 737, which 
determined the ethanol blend in all gasoline in the country. 
Today, Brazil is the largest ethanol producer in the world. For 
Cetrulo (2010), current investments in the sector might place 
the country in a strategic position. The potential for ethanol 
production in Brazil has led to reduced dependence on the 
international oil market, reaping benefits from energy auton-
omy which are clear in light of the economic crises caused by 
periods of high fluctuations in oil prices and the ambiguity of 
petroleum availability in the medium and long term (CETRU-
LO, 2010, p.13).
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The Brazilian government is aware of the potential that 
biofuels represent in terms of growth. Currently, 7.5% of the 
country’s arable land is covered by sugar cane farming, and a 
zoning program has mapped and delineated the area in which 
the crop can be expanded. 
The current scenario can be explained in part by recognition 
of the quality / sustainability of ethanol. Sugarcane ethanol in 
Brazil produces 7,000 liters per hectare, while maize produces 
3,800, and wheat only 2,500 liters. 
UNICA (2010) estimates that in 2015/2016 the production 
cycle of cane sugar will surpass 829 million tons, reaching 
1,038 billion in 2020/2021. This growth has a direct impact 
on the volume of biofuel produced in the country, but also 
represents gains in renewable energy.
As Table 1 shows, Brazil will increase production from 
46.9 billion liters of ethanol in 2015/2016 to 65.3 billion in 
2020/2021. This represents a 39% increase in production in a 
five-year period. Investments in the sector should also represent 
gains in bioenergy. In 2012, ethanol represented the second 
largest source in the Brazilian energy matrix. 
The Brazilian scenario demonstrates that the commitment 
of the government in agro and biofuels chains is based mainly 
on the growing importance assigned to the fuel by the US and 
European Union governments. Brazil should not lose sight of 
the opportunity to remain a leader in this segment, contributing 
actively to the technical and political debate, with proposals 
and initiatives to overcome the challenges. 
Considered one of the most competitive sectors in the world, 
the ethanol business is undergoing an important merger and 
acquisition movement. 
Oil companies have made acquisitions or alliances with 
equity stakes in the ethanol market. In 2008 Petrobras Biofuels 
was formed as an arm of the industry group Petrobras. Its 
market share of ethanol began in late 2009 with the purchase 
of 40% of Total Sugarcane Industry in Minas Gerais. In 2010, 
Petrobras Biofuels and Tereos Group, the third largest sugar 
producer in Europe, announced a strategic alliance to jointly 
invest in Guarani, the fourth largest processor of sugarcane in 
Brazil, forming Tereos International, the fourth largest producer 
of ethanol in the world, producing 490 million liters (AGÊNCIA 
PETROBRAS, 2010).
Beyond Petroleum (formerly British Petroleum), the third 
largest oil producer worldwide, began its investments in re-
newable energy in 2000. In 2008, it acquired 50% of the Trop-
ical plant located in Goias, and in March 2011, took control 
of the CNAA plant, moving from 32nd to 21st place among the 
largest producers of sugar and ethanol. The focus of this study 
is the largest of all these operations, led by two major players, 
Cosan and Shell, which will be described in the next section.
4. THE CASE IN FOCUS
4.1. Cosan and Shell joint venture: the emergence of Raízen
Cosan, one of the largest producers / exporters of sugar and 
ethanol in the world, and the largest producer of electricity from 
sugar cane bagasse, was founded in 1936 with the construction 
of the Usina Costa Pinto in Piracicaba, São Paulo.
The 1980s saw the beginning of an expansion process based 
primarily on acquisitions. By 2005, Cosan shares were being 
traded in the Novo Mercado da Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo 
(Bovespa). In 2007, the group was listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange, which made the firm the first Brazilian company to 
control securities traded directly on the NYSE. A year later, 
in 2008, it completed the acquisition of Esso Brasileira de 
Petroleo SA, acquiring its assets and fuel distribution business 
as well as the manufacturing and distribution of lubricants and 
aviation fuels businesses, including the license to use the Esso 
and Mobil brands.
Nowadays Cosan holdings participates in nine economic 
segments: sugar and ethanol production, fuel distribution, gas 
distribution, power generation, lubricants, logistics, and land.
The company defines its field of operation as follows:
“It is part of the solution in this new context of 
sustainable development. Invests in technology, 
plant, harvest, produces and distributes power to the 
people (food) for cars (fuel) and houses (electricity). 
Produces energy for life” (COSAN RI, 2009).
Shell is a leading oil and gas company worldwide. It also 
holds businesses in producing liquefied natural gas, products 
for converting gas into liquids, development of sustainable 
biofuels, and wind power projects.
The group’s history began about 200 years ago, when Mar-
cus Samuel opened a business to import and export sea shells 
from the Far East. The trade was then assumed by Samuel’s 
sons, Mark and Sam Junior.
Table 1
Brazilian Ethanol Production Estimates
Alcohol (Billions of Liters) 2015/2016 2020/2021
Domestic Demand 34.6 49.6
Exporting  Surplus 12.3 15.7
Bioenergy (MW Average) 11.500 14.400
Share in the Brazilian energy 
matrix (%) 15% 15%
Source: MME (2010).
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It was in 1886 that the format of the old business began 
to change. With the arrival of the internal combustion engine 
came an increase in demand for transport fuel. Leveraging their 
expertise in shipping, the brothers Samuel hired a fleet of ships 
powered by steam to carry crude oil. They revolutionized the 
transportation of oil with the maiden voyage of the first tanker, 
the Murex, which in 1892 was the first ship to transit the Suez 
Canal. In 1897, the company was named Shell Transport and 
Trading Company, and adopted a mussel shell as its logo. In 
1907, Shell Transport in the East merged with Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, forming the Royal Dutch Shell Group. Currently 
the company operates in over 90 countries, with over 101,000 
employees. In Brazil, Shell has had subsidiaries since 1913, and 
currently operates in the fuel retail, aviation, lubricants, marine, 
chemicals, supplies, and fuel distribution sectors. 
In February 2011, Cosan SA and Royal Dutch Shell an-
nounced an equity joint venture operation called Raízen. The 
resultant joint venture is one of the five largest companies in 
Brazil by revenue, with a market value estimated at US$12 
billion, approximately 40,000 employees, 23 sugar plants (São 
Paulo, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goias), 4,500 service stations, 
more than 500 convenience stores, 53 distribution terminals, 
and a presence in 54 airports in the aviation fuel business. It 
will occupy a position among the most competitive companies 
in the area of sustainable energy in the world.
4.2. Raízen
Raízen will be responsible for the production of more than 
2.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year to serve domestic and 
foreign markets. Besides ethanol, the 23 existing mills produce 
4 million tons of sugar and have 900 MW of installed electric 
power production capacity from sugarcane bagasse. In the fuel 
area, the joint venture will market approximately 20 billion 
liters to the transportation and industry sectors and its network 
of 4,500 service stations.
Shareholders expect to see a production mix of 50% from 
sugar and 50% from ethanol until 2016, and after that reach 60% 
ethanol production. The growth strategy is based on expansion 
of the group’s plants and acquisition of others. 
In the distribution sector, Raízen was born as the third-
-largest player, behind Ultra Group and Petrobras. In two 
years, Raízen intends to convert all Esso service stations into 
Shell-branded units, which will move Raízen to second rank 
in the downstream business ranking. 
4.2.1. The background: what were the incentives?
Shell’s interest in a possible alliance with Cosan was ini-
tiated in mid-2005 by Peter Voser, then Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) of Royal Dutch Shell. However, at that time, Cosan saw 
no reason for a partnership. Discussions did not begin until 
2007, when Cosan had already begun the process of purchasing 
the fuel distribution operations of Exxon Mobil in Brazil. The 
negotiations had advanced significantly when Peter Voser was 
appointed as Shell’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in 2009.
Shell’s incentives for the alliance were aligned with a stra-
tegic goal: to expand its activities in renewable fuel with high 
efficiency. The choice for Cosan was based on its leadership 
position in the sugar and ethanol market, and its focus on sugar 
cane as raw material.
Since 2002 Shell has had a stake in Iogen Corporation, in 
line with its strategy of amplifying its presence in the biofuel 
market. Shell and Iogen are cooperating on the commercializa-
tion of cellulosic ethanol; Iogen is a manufacturer and marketer 
of enzyme products for application in processes that hydrolyze 
or modify natural fiber, and these products can be used in the 
pulp and paper, grain, brewing, textile, and animal feed indu-
st ries (IOGEN, 2010). Shell has also owned around 50% of the 
capital of the Codexis company since 2007. Through a research 
program, Shell aimed to shorten the timeline for deployment of 
the Iogen biofuel technology on a commercial scale.
On the other hand, for Cosan, the JV was driven primarily 
by four factors:
• generate scale in the distribution of fuel, increasing its net-
work that began with the acquisition of Exxon’s operations;
• gain access to international markets;
• obtain financial leverage;
• acquire knowledge of new technologies for 2nd generation 
ethanol.
Because its net debt amounted to US$ 2.5 billion, Raízen 
received an injection of US$ 1.6 billion in the form of royalties 
relating to the Shell brand licensing for Cosan over 10 years. 
Internationalization will be made possible through the sale 
of ethanol in countries where Shell operates. Shell is a major 
fuel producer and trader in the world, and the world’s largest 
integrated oil company.
Shell also contributed its participation in Iogen and 
Codexis to Raízen, which allows the JV access to 2nd genera-
tion technologies for extracting ethanol from high performance 
biomass such as sugarcane bagasse. Figure 1 describes the 
assets contributed and not contributed by Cosan and Shell for 
the Raízen joint venture.
In five years, the JV intends to increase its crushing ca-
pacity by 65%, amplify cogeneration by 44%, launch the 2nd 
generation of ethanol, and grow its ethanol trading by 136%. 
Both firms expand their competences through the JV. The 
growth of the two parent firms was motivated not only by ex-
ogenous factors such as climate pressure and rising oil prices, 
which affected other players as well, but rather the apparent 
commitment of internal resources as a starting point to their 
competitive advantages. As a result, the JVs market power 
arises due to the strength of both companies. 
The main incentive relies on the assessment of new com-
petences by the two firms. Indeed, the exchange of knowledge 
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emerging from the alliance reflects the sharing of each firm’s 
core competences. The JV will benefit from Cosan’s knowledge 
of ethanol production and distribution throughout the country, 
as well as Shell’s knowledge of fuel production, trade, and 
retailing, and also Iogen’s and Codexis’ 2nd generation biofuel 
technology.
Raízen can be considered a Link type of JV as described 
by Hennart (1988), since it constitutes a vertical investment 
for Cosan and a diversification for Shell. The decision for the 
JV over other governance modes, such as hierarchy or market, 
can be understood as a way to economize on transaction costs 
and also to jointly protect specific investments in process and 
brand. Figure 2 illustrates the full integration of the ethanol 
chain in the JV creation, resulting in cost-effective procurement, 
as stated by Williamson (1996).
4.2.2. Sharing competences: the resultant competitive  
 advantages
Although it is a new organization, Raízen carries the ex-
perience of its shareholders. It is a national organization that 
benefits from having the products and solutions portfolio of a 
global leader in fuel production and distribution, and a global 
player in the ethanol and sugar market. 
For the investor, Cosan RI (2009) highlights the alliance 
benefits: 
Figure 1: Transaction Overview
Source: Cosan RI (2009).
Figure 2: Fully Integrated Chain
Source: Cosan RI (2009).
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• increased competitiveness in the biofuels and fuels distribu-
tion businesses;
• broader access to ethanol consumer markets;
• substantial growth perspectives;
• building of a unique platform to develop second-generation 
technology;
• improvement of debt ratios through capital injection and 
potential increase of cash generation;
• improved business intelligence;
• access to the highest standards in corporate management.
Some synergies are emphasized:
• Internationalization – Cosan can take advantage of Shell’s 
downstream structure around the world in order to trade 
premium ethanol products, already sold in Brazil as V-Power 
Ethanol and aviation fuels.
• Scale from the integrated structure – Raízen amplifies Shell’s 
and Cosan’s downstream network, and can trade ethanol to 
competitors, as well as buy fuel from other oil companies, 
in search of the best bargain. Figure 3 illustrates Raízen’s 
market share and volume sold.
• Knowledge and technology transfer – from land develop-
ment for farming, technology, crushing, production, and 
cogeneration to trading and fuel retailing, Raízen benefits 
from the knowledge of the core competences of both parent 
companies. In particular, Raízen will have an R&D core ded-
icated to the development of and access to new generation 
technologies in biofuel production and extraction. 
• Brand equity – in 2014 all Brazil’s Esso service stations 
(1700) will be converted into Shell brand stations, account-
ing for an investment of US$50 million. The Shell brand is 
licensed to Raízen for a 10-year period.
According to Cosan’s investor documents, the net present 
value of all synergies amounts to US$2 billion, earned from: 
commercial synergies for greater volume, unified pricing pol-
icy, and sale of premium products (US$700 million); financial 
synergies with improvement in credit rating, refinancing of 
contributed debt, and reduction in the average cost of debt 
(US$200 million); logistics, distribution, and trading synergies 
from reduction of freight costs, optimization of distribution ter-
minals, and centralized commercialization of ethanol (US$850 
million); and synergies from the conversion of service stations 
(US$50 million).
The observable competitive advantage arises from the 
combination of several specific assets from the parent firms that 
are not efficiently redeployable without losing value for their 
specific use. As Teece (1998) states, competitive advantage can 
be assigned to the ability to combine knowledge assets needed 
to create value. Besides knowledge, the JV holds other specific 
assets as a source of value creation:
• Dedicated assets and site specificity – ethanol production 
from sugarcane has specificity, and Brazilian producers 
have shown their superiority in productivity and biomass 
exploitation, which captured the attention of Shell and other 
players. Those assets are dynamic capabilities since they are 
constantly evaluated, and in the JV’s case will grow further 
based on 2nd generation technology.
• Brand name – Shell has built a reputation that is staked on 
its fully-integrated chain for oil production, trading, and 
retailing. The JV will benefit from this reputation in order 
to economize in transaction costs over having to establish 
Figure 3: Market Share and Volume Sold
Source: Cosan RI (2009).
R.Adm., São Paulo, v.48, n.2, p.359-374, abr./maio/jun. 2013 369
Sharing competenceS in Strategic allianceS: a caSe Study of the coSan and Shell biofuel venture 
contracts by itself. The JV might take advantage of relational 
contracts and all the explicit and tacit knowledge embedded 
in the downstream processes and routines. 
 
4.2.3. Governance mechanisms and their challenges 
As analyzed in the two previous sections, Raízen represents 
a hybrid form based on bilateral dependence and a central 
strategic authority. The economizing incentives also revealed 
other costs, such as monitoring and controlling costs to avoid 
agency problems. 
Figure 4 shows the equal sharing of authority, both in the 
formation of the management board, with equal numbers of 
members from each partner company, and in the constitution of 
the new business areas that are now headed by former employ-
ees of partner companies in their respective knowledge areas.
Raízen is a closed company, with control shared by the two 
parent companies (50%/50%). The governance mechanism is 
based on a shareholder agreement, which intends to minimize 
hold-up risks by both parties. The main issue is related to the 
Lock up and Buy Options: after 10 years, Shell can exercise 
the right to buy half or all of Cosan’s shares in the JV. In the 
15th year, the two parties can mutually exercise their options, 
which are: Cosan has the right to buy the totality of Shell’s 
sh are, or only Shell’s participation in the sugar, ethanol, and 
power business, if Shell intends to keep the downstream business 
in the JV. The lock-up period will be extended for six years after 
the JV’s creation, which means that neither Cosan, nor Rubens 
Ometto (Cosan’s controlling shareholder), nor Shell can transfer 
their shares in the JV. The knowledge transfer issues arising 
from the establishment of these agreements cry out for analysis. 
During the ten-year first period of the JV, both companies 
can benefit from economies of scope and scale, as well as the 
competences developed (dynamic capabilities). After that, Shell 
has the option to buy Cosan’s part in the JV. This might point 
out different incentives for each company. In this arrangement, 
Figura 4: The Governance Structure
Source: Cosan RI (2009).
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Shell has more interest in appropriating and developing new 
technologies for biofuels than Cosan appears to. If Shell exer-
cises its buy option in the tenth year, the company will become 
the world’s largest producer and retailer of biofuels (ethanol 
or other biomass sources). On other hand, Cosan will be trans-
formed into a diversified company with business in the areas of 
lubricants, lands, sugar trading, logistics, gas, and electricity. As 
an evidence of its diversification strategy, in April 2012 Cosan 
announced the acquisition of a controlling share of COMGAS, 
one of the major players in gas distribution in Brazil.
As is common in joint ventures, the agents of Raízen may 
face some governance challenges related to the decision rights 
allocation mechanisms, and even the coordination of the assets 
used jointly. Some challenges are discussed below:
• The double agency problem – the board might decide on mat-
ters related to the parent companies more than those related 
to the JV. This can happen when the members are agents of 
the parent firms and their main incentives are linked to those 
firms more than the JV.
• Agent and principal as shareholders – Rubens Ometto Mello 
is the main individual shareholder of Raízen and chairman of 
Cosan’s Board, and is based in Brazil. The possible asymme-
try of information between the two parent companies might 
be mitigated by the presence of a former Shell executive as 
JV chairman. It is expected that he will monitor and control 
the other partner’s influence and knowledge of the Brazilian 
market that Shell lacks. As pointed out by Mowery, Oxley, and 
Silverman (1996), cultural differences and distance should be 
taken into account as an obstacle for governance effectiveness.
• Transactions with related parties – Raízen’s supply chain is 
based on contracts with sugar cane producers, among them 
the company Radar, which is controlled by Cosan. Also, 
some operations between Raízen and logistics companies 
controlled by Cosan might become conflicted. Will some 
potentially morally hazardous behavior emerge, despite the 
safeguards in the JV shareholder agreement? Will these issues 
be properly controlled and monitored for both companies in 
order to avoid future disputes?
Although facing important challenges based on some percep-
tions in the marketplace, the joint venture is positively evaluated 
by market analysts and some of Cosan’s other key stakeholders, 
such as sugar cane suppliers and the internal staff of Raízen. 
Despite the clear strategic synergies, the agreement with Shell has 
enhanced the reputation of Cosan and increased the perception 
that a higher level of corporate governance standards will be put 
in place, both in the parent company (Cosan) and the JV (Raízen).
Table 2 presents the key concepts of the theories used to 
analyze the case and subsequent expected challenges for the 
enterprise.
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a joint venture between two major players in 
the fuels market, Cosan and Royal Dutch Shell, was analyzed 
through the lens of the TCE and dynamic capabilities the-
oretical frameworks. The central point for the merger was 
the partners’ incentives to reach new markets, capture value 
through economies of scope and scale, and jointly use specific 
and valuable assets. These elements characterize a hybrid form 
that temporarily appears to be the more effective governance 
mode for appropriating and continuously developing know- 
ledge and economizing in transaction costs, compared to mar-
ket and hierarchy modes.
Although the issues discussed here are abstractions for the 
future based on theoretical and prior empirical research, Raízen 
has taken a leadership position in the world ethanol market, 
demonstrating the planning and vision of both partners. Raízen 
was born an important player in the world energy sector: as a 
result, it might use its competitive advantages to continue to 
enlarge and accumulate more valuable resources. As Penrose 
(1995) states, the firm’s growth will be determined by the rate at 
which experienced managerial staff can devise and implement 
plans. In hybrid forms, the managerial staff corresponds to a 
central authority shared by the two partners. And at this point, 
governance mechanisms for better rights allocation should be 
undertaken.
Raízen faces some challenges ahead related to controlling 
and monitoring agents’ behavior, considering that it is a two-
-part organism formed by distinctive organizational cultures, 
tacit knowledge, and long-term incentives. As this is an open 
case, and based on the literature visited, some hypotheses might 
be further proposed for this case in order to evaluate the value 
creation effect for both partners:
• The greater the volume of exchange between the alliance 
partners, the greater the potential will be to generate relational 
rents (quasi rents) through relation-specific assets.
• The greater the alignment of incentives by alliance partners 
to encourage transparency and reciprocity and to discou-
rage free riding, the greater the potential will be to generate 
relational rents through knowledge sharing.
• The greater the alliance partners’ ability to align transactions 
with governance structures for transaction cost minimizing 
and value maximizing, the greater the potential will be for 
relational rents.
• The greater the alliance partners’ ability to employ informal 
self-enforcing safeguards (e.g. trust) rather than formal self-
-enforcing safeguards (e.g. financial hostages), the greater the 
potential will be for relational rent, owing to lower marginal 
costs and difficulty of imitation.
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Some further questions should also be addressed: are hy-
brids the dominant form of organizing transactions in a market 
economy, due to their efficiency in minimizing conventional 
transaction frictions more evident in the polar modes? Despite 
the higher standards of corporate governance, will the important 
Table 2
Theoretical Framework Analysis 
Theoretical Assumptions Raízen Implications Challenges
Hybrid Forms preserve 
autonomy: there is bilateral 
dependence, and also the 
flexibility to adapt to the other 
firm, but it may face incentive 
problems (TCE).
Raízen is clearly a hybrid form since it is composed 
of the equity of two partner companies seeking 
to combine resources. The bilateral dependence 
appears strong in order to reach scope and scale 
economies and to transfer knowledge  
between partners.
• The incentives of both partners must be  
  aligned to ensure the effective resource  
  combining.
• A trust relationship must be central to  
  the JV in the long term.
Strategic alliances as a way 
of capturing capabilities and 
resources of other companies 
that can lead to sustainable 
competitive advantages (RBV).
Raízen benefits from Shell’s  downstream 
competences and assets that amplify its market 
power in oil distribution.
On the other hand, Cosan’s competence in ethanol 
production and distribution will diversify Shell’s 
knowledge and the role it plays in the biodiesel market. 
• The combining and interchanging  
  competences represent a crucial  
  challenge for both companies.
• Investments in specific assets should  
  be shared and remain within the  
  JV’s scope. 
Incentives to alliances being 
formed:
• access to capital markets; 
• internationalization;
• acquisition of technological  
  and other complex  
  capabilities from partner  
  companies (Relational View).
Through the JV Cosan has reached new markets 
for ethanol distribution, and also received funding 
for plant expansion. Technology sharing is possible 
considering Shell’s stake in Iogen and Codexis. For 
Shell, the main incentive remains in the sharing of 
all knowledge and assets of the largest producer of 
ethanol in the Brazilian market.
• Monitoring and agency costs may arise  
  in order to safeguard the interests of  
  both partners. 
• Iogen and Codexis might not have  
  efficient incentives to share their  
  knowledge with the JV. 
Additional agency costs can 
be decisive for stability in Joint 
Venture arrangements (Agency 
Cost Theory).
Raízen is exposed to the double agency problem: the 
principals in the JV can be “agents” in their respective 
parent companies (e.g. in transactions with related 
parties).
Asymmetry of information among parent companies 
with specific knowledge in upstream (Cosan) and 
downstream (Shell) markets. 
• Shareholder agreement: buy options.
• Governance mechanisms that reduce  
  asymmetric information.
• Governance mechanisms to mitigate  
  ex post opportunistic behavior (hold  
  up) and creation of bilateral  
  dependence devices.
• Clear rules regarding transactions with  
  related parties.
cultural differences between a global multinational company 
(Shell) and an emergent and until recently family-owned group 
(Cosan) become a threat to the stability of the JV? These can 
form the central questions for further studies on this complex 
theme.
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Sharing competences in strategic alliances: a case study of the Cosan and Shell  
biofuel venture
In a competitive world, the way a firm establishes its organizational arrangements may determine the enhancement of 
its core competences and the possibility of reaching new markets. Firms that find their skills to be applicable in just 
one type of market encounter constraints in expanding their markets, and through alliances may find a competitive 
form of value capture. Hybrid forms of organization appear primarily as an alternative to capturing value and manag-
ing joint assets when the market and hierarchy modes do not present any yields for the firm’s competitiveness. As a 
result, this form may present other challenging issues, such as the allocation of rights and principal-agent problems. 
The biofuel market has presented a strong pattern of changes over the last 10 years. New intra-firm arrangements have 
appeared as a path to participate or survive among global competition. Given the need for capital to achieve better 
results, there has been a consistent movement of mergers and acquisitions in the Biofuel sector, especially since the 
2008 financial crisis. In 2011 there were five major groups in Brazil with a grinding capacity of more than 15 million 
tons per year: Raízen (joint venture formed by Cosan and Shell), Louis Dreyfus, Tereos Petrobras, ETH, and Bunge. 
Major oil companies have implemented the strategy of diversification as a hedge against the rising cost of oil. Using 
the alliance of Cosan and Shell in the Brazilian biofuel market as a case study, this paper analyses the governance 
mode and challenging issues raised by strategic alliances when firms aim to reach new markets through the sharing of 
core competences with local firms. The article is based on documentary research and interviews with Cosan’s Investor 
Relations staff, and examines the main questions involving hybrid forms through the lens of the Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE), Agency Theory, Resource Based View (RBV), and dynamic capabilities theoretical ap proaches. 
One focal point is knowledge “appropriability” and the specific assets originated by the joint venture. Once the alliance 
is formed, it is expected that competences will be shared and new capabilities will expand the limits of the firm. In 
the case studied, Cosan and Shell shared a number of strategic assets related to their competences. Raízen was formed 
with economizing incentives, as well to continue marshalling internal resources to enhance the company’s presence in 
the world energy sector. Therefore, some challenges might be related to the control and monitoring agents’ behavior, 
considering the two-part organism formed by distinctive organizational culture, tacit knowledge, and long-term in-
centives. The case study analyzed illustrates the hybrid arrangement as a middle form for organizing the transaction: 
neither in the market nor in the hierarchy mode, but rather a more flexible commitment agreement with a strategic 
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central authority. The corporate governance devices are also a challenge, since the alignment between the parent 
companies in the joint ventures is far more complex. These characteristics have led to an organism with bilateral 
dependence, offering favorable conditions for developing dynamic capabilities. However, these conditions might rely 
on the partners’ long-term interest in the joint venture. 
Keywords: biofuel, joint venture, governance, hybrids forms.
Competencias compartidas en alianzas estratégicas: un estudio de la asociación entre  
Cosan y Shell en el mercado de biocombustibles
En un mundo competitivo, la manera como una empresa establece sus disposiciones organizacionales puede determinar 
la mejora de sus competencias esenciales y la posibilidad de alcanzar nuevos mercados. Empresas que actúan en un 
solo tipo de  mercado encuentran restricciones para expandirse, no obstante, pueden encontrar una forma competitiva 
de crear valor por medio de alianzas estratégicas. Las formas híbridas de organización aparecen principalmente como 
una alternativa a la hora de capturar valor y administrar activos, cuando el mercado y la jerarquía organizacional no 
presentan rendimientos para la competitividad de la empresa. Como resultado, esta forma presenta desafíos, tales como 
la asignación de derechos y problemas de agencia. El mercado de biocombustibles ha presentado cambios continuos 
a lo largo de los últimos diez años. Nuevos acuerdos entre empresas aparecieron como un medio de participar o so-
brevivir en el escenario de la competencia global. Dada la necesidad de capital para lograr mejores resultados, se ha 
producido un movimiento constante de fusiones y adquisiciones en el sector de los biocombustibles, especialmente 
desde la crisis financiera de 2008. En 2011 existían cinco grandes grupos en Brasil, con una capacidad de molienda 
de más de 15 millones de toneladas al año: Raízen (joint venture formada por Cosan y Shell), Louis Dreyfus, Tereos 
Petrobras, ETH, y Bunge. Las principales empresas petroleras han puesto en práctica una estrategia de diversificación 
como forma de protección contra el aumento del costo del petróleo. Por medio del estudio de la alianza entre Cosan 
y Shell en el mercado brasileño de biocombustibles, se analizan en este trabajo el modo de gobernanza y los desafíos 
que se plantean cuando las empresas intentan conquistar nuevos mercados compartiendo competencias básicas con las 
empresas locales. Este artículo se basa en investigación documental y entrevistas con profesionales del departamento 
de Relaciones con Inversores de Cosan. Se examinan las principales cuestiones que involucran formas híbridas por 
medio de la Teoría de los Costos de Transacción, Teoría de la Agencia, Teoría de Recursos y Capacidades (RBV) y 
el estudio teórico de las Capacidades Dinámicas. Un punto central es la apropiación del conocimiento y los activos 
específicos generados por la alianza estratégica. Una vez que se forme la alianza, se espera que las competencias 
sean compartidas y que las nuevas capacidades amplíen los límites de la empresa. En el caso estudiado, Cosan y 
Shell comparten una serie de recursos estratégicos relacionados con sus competencias. Raízen se formó a partir de 
incentivos económicos y siguió reuniendo recursos internos para mejorar la presencia de la compañía en el sector 
energético mundial. Sin embargo, algunos problemas podrían relacionarse con el control y el monitoreo o seguimiento 
de los agentes, teniéndose en cuenta que la empresa Raízen está formada por dos partes que presentan cultura orga-
nizacional, conocimiento tácito e incentivos de largo plazo distintos. El caso en estudio ilustra un acuerdo híbrido 
como una forma alternativa de organizar las transacciones entre empresas: ni de mercado ni de jerarquía, sino más 
bien un término de compromiso más flexible con una autoridad central. Los dispositivos de gobernanza corporativa 
son asimismo un desafío, ya que la alineación entre empresas semejantes en joint ventures es mucho más compleja. 
Estas características dan lugar a un organismo con dependencia bilateral, lo que ofrece condiciones favorables al 
desarrollo de capacidades dinámicas. Sin embargo, tales condiciones dependen de los intereses a largo plazo de cada 
parte de la alianza estratégica.
Palabras clave: biocombustible, joint venture, alianza estratégica, gobierno corporativo.
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